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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
This is an appeal from a memorandum decision, of the First District Court of Box Elder 
County, granting the appellees motion to dismiss the Appellant's complaint under Rule 
12(b)(6) URCP and disqualifying Charles Schultz as acting as counsel for Ms. Pett in the 
trial court proceeding. The memorandum decision was signed by Judge Clint Judkins, a 
judge in the First District. 
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JURISDICTION 
Original jurisdiction of this appeal was vested in the Utah Supreme Court pursuant 
to the provisions of UCA §78-2-2(3)(j). The Utah Court of Appeals now has jurisdiction 
pursuant to the provisions of UCA §78-2a-3(2)(j). 
IV 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in granting the appellees' motion under Rule 12 (b)(6) 
URCP? 
v 
Standard of Review: The grant or denial of a motion to dismiss under rule 
12(b)(6) URCP is a question of law that is reviewed under the correctness standard. See 
St Benedicts Development Co. v. St Benedicts Hosp.. 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991). 
2. Did the trial court err in granting the appellee's motion to disqualify Mr. 
Schultz as counsel for Ms. Pett? 
Standard of Review; The proper standard of review for decisions relating to 
disqualification of counsel is abuse of discretion; however, to the extent the Supreme 
Court has a special interest in administering the law governing attorney ethical rules, a 
trial court's discretion is limited. Cheves v. Williams 993 P.2d 191 (Utah 1999). 
3. Did the trial court err in denying Ms. Pett's Motion to Strike the appellees' 
response to Ms. Pett's Motion for Summary Judgment? * 
Standard of Review: A motion to strike presents a question of law; accordingly, 
review the trial court's denial of the motion to strike the appellees' reply to Ms. Pett's 
Motion for Summary Judgment is reviewed under a correction of error standard Matter 
ofBabyBoyDoe. 894 P.2d 1285 (Utah App.,1995). 
vi 
V 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. 
ORDINANCES. RULES ANB REGULATIONS 
Statutes; 
UCA §57-1-33.1(1) 
Reconveyance of a trust deed — Erroneous reconveyance. 
(1) (a) When an obligation secured by a trust deed has been satisfied, the trustee shall, 
upon written request by the beneficiary, reconvey the trust property. 
(b) At the time die beneficiary requests a reconveyance under Subsection(Vfa), the 
beneficiary shall deliver to the trustee or the trustee's successor in interest the trust deed 
and the note or other evidence that the obligation securing the trust deed has been 
satisfied. 
UCA §57-l-38(3)(a) 
(3) A secured lender or servicer who fails to release the security interest on a secured loan 
within 90 days after receipt of the final payment of the loan is liable to another secured 
lender on the real property or the owner or titleholder of the real property for: {a) 
the greater of $1,000 or treble actual damages incurred because of the failure to release 
the security interest, including all expenses incurred in completing a quiet title action; and 
UCA §57-l-38(3)(b) 
(3) A secured lender or servicer who fails to release the security interest on a secured loan 
within 90 days after receipt of the final payment of the loan is liable to another secured 
lender on the real property or the owner or titleholder of the real property for: 
(b) reasonable attorneys' fees and court costs. 
RULES: 
URCPRULE6: 
Time, (a) Computation. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these 
rules, by the local rules of any district ^ ourt, by order of court, or by any applicable statute, 
the day of the act, event, or default from which the designated period of time begins to run 
shall not be included. The last day of the period so computed shall be included, unless it is 
vii 
rules, by the local rules of any district court, by order of court, or by any applicable statute, 
the day of the act, event, or default from which the designated period of time begins to run 
shall not be included. The last day of the period so computed shall be included, unless it is 
a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the 
next day which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. When the period of time 
prescribed or allowed, without reference to any additional time provided under subsection 
(e), is less than 11 days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays shall be 
excluded in the computation. 
(b) Enlargement. When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of the 
court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the court for 
cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) with or without motion or notice order the 
period enlarged if request therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally 
prescribed or as extended by a previous order or (2) upon motion made after the expiration 
of the specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the result of 
excusable neglect; but it may not extend the time for taking any action under Rules 50(b), 
52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), and 60(b), except to the extent and under the conditions stated in 
them. 
(c) Unaffected by expiration of term* The period of time provided for the doing of any act 
or the taking of any proceeding is not affected or limited by the continued existence or 
expiration of a term of court. The continued existence or expiration of a term of court in no 
way affects the power of a court to do any act or take any proceeding in any civil action 
which has been pending before it. 
(d) For motions - Affidavits, A written motion, other than one which may be heard ex parte, 
and notice of the hearing thereof shall be served not later than 5 days before the time 
specified for the hearing, unless a different period is fixed by these rules, by CJA 4-501, or 
by order of the court. Such an order may for cause shown be made on ex parte application. 
When a motion is supported by affidavit, the affidavit shall be served with the motion; and, 
except as otherwise provided in Rule 59(c), opposing affidavits may be served not later than 
1 day before the hearing, unless the court permits them to be served at some other time. 
(e) Additional time after service by mask Whenever a party has the right or is required to 
do some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of a notice 
or other paper upon him and the notice or paper is served upon him by mail, 3 days shall be 
added to the end of the prescribed period as calculated under subsection (a). Saturdays, 
Sundays and legal holidays shall be included in the computation of any 3-day period under 
this subsection, except that if the last day of the 3-day period is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a 
legal holiday, the period shall run until the end of the next day which is not a Saturday, 
Sunday
 y or a legal holiday. 
viii 
UUCP RULE 12(B)(6): 
Rule 12. Defenses and objections. 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any pleading, whether 
a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive 
pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the option of 
the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of 
jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) 
insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of these defenses 
shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is 
waived by being joined with one or more other defenses or objections in a responsive 
pleading or motion or by further pleading after the denial of such motion or objection. If a 
pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the adverse party is not required to serve a 
responsive pleading, the adverse party may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to 
that claim for relief. I£ on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure 
of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading 
are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for 
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given 
reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
URCP RULE 56: 
Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or 
to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the 
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the 
adverse party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor upon all or any part thereof 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is 
asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be filed 
and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits^  if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory 
in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue 
as to the amount of damages. 
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moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory 
in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue 
as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not 
rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at 
the hearing of the motion^ by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by 
interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without 
substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. 
It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial 
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in 
controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial 
of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be 
conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing 
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be 
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify 
to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred 
to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit 
affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or 
further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided 
in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his 
pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, 
summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(i) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing 
the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his 
opposition, die court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to 
permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may 
make such other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the court at any time 
that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely 
for the purpose of delay, die court shall forthwith order the party employing them to pay to 
the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits 
caused him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney 
be adjudged guilty of contempt 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the trial court's memorandum decision granting the 
appellees' Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the appellees' motion to disqualify Charles Schultz as 
counsel for Ms. Pett and the trial court's denial of Ms. Pett's Motion to Strike the 
appellees' memorandum in opposition to Ms. Pett's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
B 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT 
Ms. Pett filed her complaint against the appellees on September 13, 2002. On or 
about November 12, 2002, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss. On or about 
November 18, 2002, the appellees filed m answer to Ms. Pett's Complaint. Ms. Pett 
opposed the appellee's motion to dismiss. 
On December 18, 2002, the appellees filed a motion to disqualify Mr. Schultz as 
counsel for Ms. Pett. Ms. Pett opposed the motion to disqualify Mr. Schultz as her 
counsel. 
On December 19, 2002, Ms. Pett filed a Motion to Strike the appellees' 
memorandum in opposition to her Motion for Summary Judgment, asserting the 
appellees' memorandum was not timely. The appellees opposed Ms. Pett's Motion to 
Strike. 
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On March 5, 2003, the trial court entered a memorandum decision granting the 
appellees' motion to dismiss, granting the appellees motion to disqualify Mr. Schultz as 
counsel for Ms. Pett and denying Ms. Pett's Motion to Strike the appellees' response to 
Ms. Pett's Motion for Summary Judgment. Ms. Pett then filed her Notice of Appeal on 
April 2, 2003. 
C 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Sheri Pett (hereinafter, "Ms. Pett") is, and at all times herein pertinent was, a 
resident of Box Elder County, State of Utah. Record at page(s) 007. 
2. The appellee Fleet Mortgage Corporation (hereinafter, "Fleet") was a foreign 
corporation transacting business in the state of Utah. Ms. Pett believes, based on her 
investigation and information, that Fleet is no longer an independent entity but rather has 
been absorbed into the group of companies and entities owned by Washington Mutual. 
Record at page(s) 040. 
3. The appellee Washington Mutual Bank (hereinafter, "'Washington") is, and at 
all times herein pertinent was, a foreign corporation transacting business in the state of 
Utah. Record at page(s) 008. 
4. The real property that is the subject of this action is located in Box Elder 
County, Utah. Record at page(s) 008 
5. Ms. Pett is the owner of certain real property located in Box Elder County, 
Utah, i.e., at 224 West 700 South, Brigham City, Utah. Record at page(s) 008. 
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6. The Appellees Fleet Mortgage Company and/or Washington Mutual Bank are 
successors in interest to a deed of trust executed by Ms. Pett and her brother Robert Pett 
to Eagle National Mortgage. Record at page(s) 008. 
7. On November 20, 2001, Ms. Pett gave Judy Jorgensen, Scott Lundberg and/or 
Lundberg & Associates (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Lundberg") who were 
acting as legal counsel for Fleet and/or Washington, a cashier's check in the amount of 
$56,629.91 as full payment for all indebtedness of any nature whatsoever with respect to 
any claims by Fleet, Washington and/or their successors in interest and/or assigns in Ms. 
Pett's property. Record at page(s) 008,009, 018,020. 
8. Prior to delivery of the referenced check to Lundberg, Ms. Pett requested that a 
deed of reconveyance be prepared and given to her at the time she paid the referenced 
$56,629.91 to Lundberg. Record at page(s) 009. 
9. Jorgensen, however, refused to provide Ms. Pett with a deed of reconveyance 
at the time of payment, in spite of the fact that Ms. Pett paid Lundberg with a cashier's 
check, and rather than providing Ms. Pett with a deed of reconveyance Jorgensen told 
Ms. Pett she would not give Ms. Pett a deed of reconveyance and that if Ms. Pett did not 
get a deed of reconveyance she could sue to get one. Record at page(s) 009, 022. 
10. Ms. Pett paid the referenced $56,629.91 to Lundberg as a part of a stipulated 
settlement in case No. 990100647, filed in the First Judicial District Court of Utah, Box 
Elder County. Record at page(s) 009, 018, 020,024 - 026. 
11. Utah Law requires that a trustee record a reconveyance of a trust deed within 
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90 days after the note securing the trust deed has been paid. Therefore, Fleet and/or 
Washington were required to record the reconveyance of Ms. Pett's property to her no 
later than February 18, 2002. Record at page(s) 009, 010. 
12. As of the date Ms. Pett filed her Complaint, no reconveyance had been filed 
by Fleet, Washington, Lundberg and/or Jorgensen, and no reconveyance has been filed 
since Ms. Pett filed her Complaint. Record at page 
(s)010. 
13. The appellees admit that they never reconveyed title to Ms. Pett's property to 
her. Record at page(s) 057, 058. 
14. Jorgensen falsely claims in her affidavit that she had an oral agreement with 
Ms. Pett's attorney Charles Schultz, (hereinafter, "Mr. Schultz"), whereby the appellees 
would simply send Ms. Pett forms that she could use to have the appellee's trust deed 
reconveyed to her. Record at page(s) 146. 
15. Jorgensen also falsely claims the Mr. Schultz requested that the appellees send 
the "do-it-yourself forms directly to Ms. Pett. Record at page(s) 146. 
16. Mr. Schultz denies that he ever had any conversation with Jorgensen wherein 
he agreed that the appellee's could satisfy their obligation to reconvey the appellee's trust 
deed to Ms. Pett by sending her any do-it-yourself forms and never requested that 
Jorgensen or the appellees send anything directly to Ms. Pett. Record at page(s) 176-178. 
17. Mr. Schultz affirmatively asserts that he never had any conversations or 
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communications of any type with Jorgensen after Jorgensen's November 16, 2001, email 
to Mr. Schultz. Record atpage(s) 176. 
18. Neither the appellees nor Jorgensen have produced, or can produce, any 
evidence supporting Jorgensen's claim that she ever had any communication with Mr. 
Schultz after Jorgensen's November 16,2001, email to Mr. Schultz. Record at page(s) 
001 - 289. 
19. Mr. Schultz' phone records prove that he never made any phone calls to 
Jorgensen after Jorgensen's November 16, 2001, email to Mr. Schultz. Record at page(s) 
176, 178. 
20. On September 13, 2002, Ms. Pett filed a Complaint against the appellees. 
Record at page(s) 004, 007. 
21. On or about November 12, 2002, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss. 
Record at page(s) 005, 053. 
22. The appellees'motion to dismiss contains allegations of facts. Record at 
page(s) 056-059. 
23. On or about November 18, 2002, the appellees also filed an answer to Ms. 
Pett's Complaint. Record at page(s) 005, 081. 
24. On November 21, 2002, Ms. Pett filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the 
appellee's motion to dismiss. Record at page(s) 005, 086. 
25. On December 18, 2002, the appellees filed a motion to disqualify Ms. Schultz 
as counsel for Ms. Pett. Record at page(s) 005, 114. 
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26. On December 19, 2002, Ms. Pett filed a Motion to Strike the appellees' 
esponse to Ms. Pett's Motion for Summary Judgment, of the appellees. Record at 
3age(s) 005, 162. 
27. On December 27, 2002, Ms. Pett filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the 
appellees' motion to disqualify Mr. Schultz. Record at page(s) 005, 166. 
28. On December 31, 2002, the appellees filed a memorandum in opposition to 
Ms. Pett's Motion to Strike the appellees' response to Ms. Pett's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Record at page(s) 005, 184. 
29. On January 3, 2003, Ms. Pett filed a Reply Memorandum in Support of her 
Motion to Strike the appellees' response to Ms. Pett's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Record at page(s) 005, 197. 
30. On January 7, 2003, the appellees filed a reply memorandum in support of 
their motion to disqualify Mr. Schultz. Record at page(s) 005, 214. 
31 On January 7, 2003, the appellees filed a reply memorandum is support of 
their motion to dismiss. Record at page(s) 005, 214. 
32. On January 13, 2003, Ms. Pett filed a Motion to Strike the appellees' reply 
memorandum in support of their motion to dismiss. Record at page(s) 005, 230. 
33. On January 17, 2003, the appellees filed a memorandum in opposition to Ms. 
Pett's Motion to Strike the appellees' reply memorandum in support of their motion to 
dismiss. Record at page(s) 005, 236. 
34. On January 17, 2003, Ms. Pett filed a Reply Memorandum in Support of her 
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Motion to Strike the reply memorandum of the appellees in support of their motion to 
dismiss. Record at page(s) 006,247. 
35. On March 5, 2003, the trial court entered a memorandum decision granting 
the appellees' motion to dismiss, disqualifying Mr. Schultz as counsel for Ms. Pett and 
denying Ms. Pett's Motion to Strike the appellees' response to Ms. Pett's Motion for 
Summary Judgment Record at page(s) 005, 267. 
36. Ms. Pett filed her Notice of Appeal on April 2, 2003 Record at page(s) 006, 
279. 
vn 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court considered matters outside of Ms. Pett's Complaint when it granted 
the appellees' motion under Rule 12(b)(6) URCP. Therefore, it committed prejudicial 
and reversible error when it granted the appellees' motion under Rule 12(b)(6) URCP. 
The trial court erred as a matter of law in granting the appellees' motion to 
disqualify Mr. Schultz as counsel for Ms. Pett based on false representations concerning a 
conversation that never took place and an alleged oral agreement that was never made. 
The trial court erred as a matter of law in failing to grant Ms. Pett's Motion to 
Strike the memorandum of the appellees in opposition to Ms. Pett's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. The trial court applied one standard for service of motions and one method of 
calculating time for Ms. Pett's filings and a different standard of service and method of 
calculating time for the appellees' filings. 
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VIII 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL AND REVERSIBLE 
ERROR WHEN IT GRANTED THE APPELLEES' RULE 12(B)(6) MOTION. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL AND REVERSIBLE WHEN 
IT GRANTED THE APPELLEES' MOTION TO DISQUALIFY MR. SCHULTZ 
AS COUNSEL FOR MS. PETT, AND THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED 
PREJUDICIAL AND REVERSIBLE WHEN IT FAILED TO GRANT MS. PETT'S 
MOTION TO STRIKE THE APPELLEES' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO MS. PETT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN GRANTING THE 
APPELLEES' RULE 12(b)(6) MOTION. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN GRANTING 
THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 12(b)(6) URCP. 
Under clear and controlling Utah law, a case may only be dismissed under Rule 
12(b)(6) URCP "if it clearly appears that complaining party can prove no set of facts in 
support of his or her claim." Richards Irr. Co. v. Karren. 880 P.2d 6 (Utah Ap. 1994). 
On motion made under Rule 12(b)(6) URCP, the court looks only to material allegations 
of complaint and not to extrinsic documents. Wright v. University of Utah 876 P.2d 380 
(Utah App 1994.) 
The trial court dismissed Ms. Pett's case under Rule 12(b)(6) URCP even though 
the trial court accepted and considered materials outside of Ms. Pett's Complaint in 
dismissing Ms. Pett's case. Utah mandates that when ruling on a motion to dismiss under 
Rule 12(b)(6) URCP, only the matters pleaded in the complaint may be considered. See 
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Olson v. Park- Craig-Olson. Inc.. 815 P.2d 1356,1360 (Utah App. 1991), declaring that 
"under Rule 12(b)(6), court looks at facts as pleaded to determine if party is entitled to 
relief " see also. Cohnan v. State Land Bd.. 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990), declaring 
that under Rule 12(b)(6) a court looks only to material allegations of complaint. 
In granting the defendant's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the trial court 
accepted the factual allegations of the defendant, contained in their memorandum in 
support of their Rule 12 (b)(6) motion as true. gge. the March 3, 2003 memorandum 
decision of the trial court, page 3, paragraph 4; page 4, paragraph 1; and page 8, 
paragraph 2. Because the trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss under 
Rule 12(b)(6) after considering and accepting the factual allegations of the defendants, 
the trial court committed prejudicial and reversible error in granting the defendants' Rule 
12(b)(6) motion. Therefore, Ms. Pett is entitled to have his Court issue an order reversing 
the trial court's dismissal of her case. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT 
CONVERTED THE DEFENDANTS' RULE 12(b)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS TO A 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT AND THEN GRANTED THE 
MOTION WITHOUT APPLYING THE PROPER STANDARDS UNDER RULE 
56 URCP FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION. 
The defendants' memorandum in support of their Rule 12 (b)(6) motion 
improperly contained factual allegations and was improperly supported by affidavits. 
Under Utah law, a motion for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) URCP must be 
based solely on the complaint or counterclaim of a party. §££ Barrus v. Wilkinson. 398 
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P.2d 207 (Utah, 1965). Nonetheless, the trial court granted the defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion, under a Rule 12(b)(6) standard, yet improperly considered and accepted the 
factual allegations of the defendants. Additionally, the trial court incorporated the 
defendants' factual allegations in its memorandum decision. See the trial court's 
memorandum decision, page 3, paragraph 4, page 4, paragraph 1, page 8, paragraph 2. 
When affidavits or other evidence is presented in conjunction with a motion to 
dismiss under rule 12(b)(6) and the court does not exclude them, the motion is generally 
treated as a motion for summary judgment pursuant to 56(c); DOIT. Inc. v. Touche. Ross 
&Co., 926 P.2d 835 (Utah, 1996), citing World Peace Movement v. Newspaper Agency 
Corp.. 879 P.2d 253 (Utah 1994); Warren v. Provo City Corp.. 838 P.2d 1125 (Utah 
1992); Johnson v. Morton ThiokoL Inc.. 818 P.2d 997, 999 (Utah 1991). Although the 
trial court considered the affidavit of the defendants filed in conjunction with their Rule 
12(b)(6) motion, the trial court failed to a apply a proper Rule 56 URCP summary 
judgment standard when it rendered its memorandum decision granting the defendants 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See The trial court's memorandum decision, page 3, paragraph 4; 
page 4, paragraph 1; and page 8, paragraph 2. Although, the trial court granted the 
defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the trial court failed to properly apply either a Rule 
12(b)(6) standard for determination of the defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion or a Rule 56 
summary judgment standard for determination of the defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion as 
required when matters outside the complaint are considered on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. 
The trial court granted the defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion based on the factual 
-10-
allegations contained in the defendants' memorandum and affidavit in support of the 
defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion but nonetheless, claimed to have decided the 
defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion based on a Rule 12(b)(6) standard. SfiS the 
memorandum decision of the trial court, page 3, paragraph 4; page 4, paragraph 1; and 
page 8, paragraph 2. 
Because the trial court based its ruling on the defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion on 
the factual allegations of the defendants and the affidavit submitted by the defendants in 
support of their 12(b)(6) motion, the trial court was required under Utah law to treat the 
defendants' Rule 12 (b)(6) motion as a motion for summary judgment. See Hill v. Grand 
Central. Inc.. 25 Utah 2d 121,477 P.2d 150 (1970); Harvey v. Sanders. 534 P.2d 905 
(Utah, 1975); Strand v. Associated Students of University of Utah. 561 P.2d 191 (Utah, 
1977); Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Utah Farm Production Credit Ass'n.. 587 P.2d 151 (Utah, 
1978); Hughes v. Housely. 599 P.2d 1250 (Utah, 1979); Lind v. Lynch. 665 P.2d 1276 
(Utah, 1983); Johnson v. Morton ThiokoL Inc.. supra; Warren v. Provo City Corp.. supra; 
World Peace Movement of Am. v. Newspaper Agency Corp., supra; Harmon City. Inc. v. 
Nielsen & Senior. 907P.2d 1162 (Utah, 1995); DOIT. Inc. v. Touche. Ross & Co.. 
supra; Taylor v. Qgden Sch. Dist. 927 P.2d 159 (Utah, 1996); Certified Sur. Group. Ltd. 
v. UT Inc.. 960 P.2d 904 (Utah, 1998); Sulzen v. Williams. 977 P.2d 497 (Utah, 
App. 1999); Krouse v. Bower. 20 P.3d 895 (Utah, 2000); Bearden v. Croft. 76, P.3d 537 
(Utah, 2000); Greene v. Utah Transit Authority. 37 P.3d 1156 (Utah, 2001). Howeyer, in 
spite of clear and unequivocal Utah law mandating that a Rule 12(b)(6) motion be treated 
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as a motion for summary judgment when affidavits or other evidence is presented in 
conjunction with a motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6) and not excluded, the trial court 
granted the defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See 
theMarch 3, 2003 mrmrorandum decision of tite trial court, page 9, stating: "For the 
reasons stated, the defendant's Motion to Dismiss is hereby granted." 
Assuming, arguendo, that the trial court in fact treated the defendants' motion to 
dismiss as a summary judgment motion, which it clearly did not, the trial court's 
dismissal of Ms. Pett's case under a Rule 56 summary judgment standard was improper. 
Therefore, the trial court's dismissal of Ms. Pett's case is prejudicial and reversible error. 
In granting the defendants' motion to dismiss the trial court made factual findings. 
See the March 3, 2003 memorandum decision of the trial court page 8, paragraph 2, 
wherein the trial court states: 
The facts of this case are as follows, on November 20, 2001, the Plaintiff 
delivered a cashier's check to Defendant fs attorney as payment in full on 
certain property. This payment was made as a part of a stipulated 
settlement of case number 990100647. On November 21, 2001, Plaintiff 
sent written demand for reconveyance. Rather that reconvey the property 
to Plaintiff directly, Defendant gathered paperwork necessary to have the 
deed reconveyed to Plaintiff and sent these documents to Defendant ls 
attorney handling the matter (Lundberg & Associated).22 Lundberg sent 
these documents to Plaintiff via UPS on January 8, 2002. The documents 
were delivered to Plaintiffs porch on January 9, 2002. These documents 
were sent to Plaintiff 50 days after receiving payment in full. A document 
titled ''Full reconveyance " was recorded in Box Elder County, Utah 
August 19, 2002.23 
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss "admits the facts alleged in the 
complaint but challenges the Plaintiffs right to relief based on those 
facts. "24 When the facts of this case are applied to the Utah Code 
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Annotated 57-1-38(4) it is seen that a reasonable procedure was 
established to release the security interest in a timely manner,25 the 
procedure was followed in good faith, 26and the reconveyance of the subject 
deed beyond 90 days was not the fault of the Defendant, the documents 
were sent and after that were in the control of the Plaintiff 
In Hill v. Grand Central. Inc.. supra, the Utah Supreme Court stated that a motion 
for summary judgment can "never be used to determine what the facts are, but only to 
ascertain whether there are any material issues of fact in dispute." See also. W.M. 
Barnes Co. V. Sohio Natural Resources Co.. 627 P.2d 56 (Utah 1981) holding "On a 
motion for summary judgment, it is not appropriate for a court to weigh disputed 
evidence concerning such factors, " and Spor v. Crested Butte Silver Mining. Inc.. 740 
P.2d 1304 (Utah 1987, declaring: "the sole inquiry to be determined is whether there is a 
material issue of fact to be decided. " In Singlketib v. Alexander. 19 Utah 2d 292, 431 
P.2d 126 (1967), the Utah Supreme Court declared that a "Court cannot consider weight 
of testimony or credibility of witness on motion for summary judgment; court simply 
determines that there is no disputed issues of material fact and that as a matter of law 
one party should prevail " In Pigs Gun Club. Inc. v. Sanpete County. 42 P.3d 379 Utah 
2002), citing Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo. 888 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah 1995), the 
Utah Supreme Court declared: 
A trial court is not authorized to weigh facts in deciding a summary 
judgment motion, but is only to determine whether a dispute of material fact 
exists. " "On a motion for summary judgment, a trial court should not weigh 
disputed evidence, and its sole inquiry should be whether material issues of 
fact exist. 
See_also, Tretheway v. Miracle Mortgage. Inc.. 995 P.2d 599 (Utah 2000). 
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In this case the trial court improperly made findings of fact based on the 
defendants' assertions of fact in their memorandum in support of their Rule 
12(b)(6)motion and the affidavit submitted by the defendants. The trial court improperly 
factually determined that: 
(A) Lundberg sent these documents to Plaintiff via UPS on January 8, 2002; 
(B) The documents were delivered to Plaintiff's porch on January 9, 2002; 
(C) When the facts of this case are applied to the Utah Code Annotated 57-1-38(4) 
it is seen that a reasonable procedure was established to release the security 
interest in a timely manner; 
(D) the procedure was followed in good faith; 
(E) the reconveyance of the subject deed beyond 90 days was not the fault of the 
Defendant; and 
(F) the documents were sent and after that were in the control of the Plaintiff 
Not only was it improper for the trial court to make the referenced findings, the 
findings are erroneous. The defendants' own documents show that the documents which 
the defendants claim were sent to Ms. Pett were actually sent to her brother Robert who 
was not an owner of the property at the time of Ms. Pett's settlement with the defendants, 
at the time Ms. Pett paid the defendants in full, at the time Ms. Pett requested a 
reconveyance, or at the time the defendants allegedly sent Ms. Pett any documents. Ms. 
Pett also disputes the defendants' assertion that any documents mailed to her were 
"delivered to Plaintiff's porch on January 9, 2002." It is, therefore, improper and 
reversibly error for the trial court to make factual findings on disputed issues on a 
summary judgment motions. See W.M. Barnes Co. V. Sohio Natural Resources Co., Hill 
v. Grand Central. Inc. and Spor v. Crested Butte Silver Mining. Inc.. supra. 
Likewise, it is improper, prejudicial and reversible error for the trial court to make 
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factual findings that the defendants had: 
1) established "a reasonable procedure was established to release the 
security interest in a timely manner" 
2) that "the procedure was followed in good faith" 
3) that "the reconveyance of the subject deed beyond 90 days was not the fault of 
the Defendant" and 
4) that "the documents were sent and after that were in the control of the 
Plaintiff." 
Again, even assuming, arguendo, that the trial court's factual findings could be supported 
by the evidence, which they cannot, the trial court was not lawfully entitled to make any 
factual findings on the defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion that should have been converted 
into a motion for summary judgment by the trial court's consideration of assertions and 
affidavits outside of Ms. Petf s complaint when the trial court granted the defendants' 
Rule 12(b)(6). 
In Hebertson v. Bank One. 342 P.2. 383 (Utah 1999), the Utah Supreme Court, 
quoting Parker v. Dodgion, 971 P.2d 496 (Utah 1998) declared that: "Summary judgment 
is appropriate only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." See also. Certified Sur. Group, Ltd. v. UT Inc.. 
supra, citing Taylor v. Ogden Sch. Dist. supra. "In ruling on a motion for summary 
judgment, the court may consider only facts that are not in dispute. " Sorensen v. Beers. 
585 P.2d 458 (Utah 1978). 
In Christensen ex rel. Christensen v. Financial Serv. Co.. 14 Utah 2d 101, 377 
P.2d 110, (1963), the Utah Supreme Court held that summary judgment cannot properly 
be granted if the allegations in the plaintiffs complaint stand in opposition to the 
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averments of the affidavits so that there are controverted issues of faci^  the determination 
of which is necessary to settle the rights of the parties, In Holbrook Co. V. Adams. 542 
P.2d 191 (Utah 1975), the Utah Supreme Court stated that "It takes only one sworn 
statement to dispute the averments on the other side of controversy and create an issue of 
fact, precluding summary judgment " 
In Sanberg v. Klein. 576 P.2d 1291 (Utah 1978), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Where the parties were not in complete conflict as to certain facts, but the 
understanding, intention, and consequences of those facts were vigorously 
disputed, the matter was not proper for summary judgment and could only 
be resolved by a trial 
In Beehive Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick Co.. 7890 P.2d 458 (Utah 1978), the Utah 
Supreme Court declared that: 
Because the disposition of a case by summary judgment denies the benefit 
of a trial on the merits, any doubt concerning questions of fact, including 
evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence, should be 
resolved in favor of the party opposing the motion. 
Because the trial court improperly made factual findings and ignored the standard 
for summary judgment when it granted the defendants9 Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Ms. Pett is 
entitled to have this Court reverse the trial court's dismissal of her case against the 
defendants 
POINT n 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN GRANTING THE 
APPELLEES' MOTION TO DISQUALIFY MR. SCHULTZ AS COUNSEL FOR 
MS. PETT. 
In their Motion to disqualify Mr. Schultz as counsel for Ms. Pett, the defendants 
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falsely claimed that Mr. Schultz entered into an oral agreement with Jorgensen whereby 
the defendants would send "do-it-yourself reconveyance forms to Ms. Pett rather than 
simply reconveying the deed of trust to Ms. Pett, as the defendants are required to do 
under Utah law. Ms. Pett, her brother and Mr. Schultz disputed that any such 
conversation ever took place, and the defendants did not, and could not, produce any 
evidence that the alleged conversation ever took place. 
In her perjured affidavit, Jorgensen claims that she had the alleged conversation 
with Mr. Schultz, but she cannot specify when the alleged conversation allegedly took 
place. She cannot specify where the alleged conversation allegedly took place, and she 
cannot produce any evidence that the alleged conversation ever took place. 
Mr. Schultz9s phone records for the time period during which the alleged 
conversation took place prove that Mr. Schultz never made any calls to Jorgensen or her 
firm. Jorgensen has not produced, and cannot produce, any phone records substantiating 
her claim that she ever had any such conversation with Mr. Schultz. Jorgensen has not 
done so, and cannot do so, because she did not know a phone number where she could 
contact Mr. Schultz during the time period she claims to have had the conversation with 
Mr. Schultz. 
Jorgensen also has not produced, and cannot produce, any documentation 
evidencing or memorializing the alleged conversation. Every conversation between Mr. 
Schultz and Jorgensen was memorialized in either a court document or an email because 
Mr. Schultz and Jorgensen did not trust each other. Jorgensen's assertion that Mr. 
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Schultz would enter into any type of agreement with Jorgensen without memorializing the 
agreement in writing is ludicrous. 
If the trial court was going to grant the defendants5 motion to disqualify Mr. 
Schultz based on Jorgensen's perjured claim that she entered into an agreement with Mr. 
Schultz, whereby it was agreed that the defendants would simply send Ms. Pett do-it-
yourself reconveyance forms, the trial court, at a minimum had to require the defendants 
to establish that the alleged conversation ever took place prior to concluding that Mr. 
Schultz was a necessary witness to the substance of the fictitious conversation. 
If Ms. Pett, Mr, Pett and Mr. Schultz had not disputed that the conversation ever 
took place and only disputed the substance of the conversation, then the trial court would 
have been correct in disqualifying Mr. Schultz as counsel for Ms. Pett. However, when 
Ms. Pett, Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz strenuously disputed that the alleged conversation ever 
took place, the trial court had to first require the defendants to prove that the alleged 
conversation ever took place before the trial court could properly determine that Ms. 
Schultz was a necessary witness to the alleged conversation. By determining that Mr. 
Schultz was a necessary witness to the alleged conversation without first determining that 
the alleged conversation ever took place, the trial court ruled on the basis of Jorgensen's 
perjured and unsupported affidavit that the conversation in fact took place as Jorgensen 
alleged and that the only question concerning the alleged conversation was the substance 
of the conservation. 
It was improper and prejudicial error for the trial court to determine, based on 
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Jorgensen's unsupported and false affidavit that the alleged oral conversation between 
Jorgensen and Mr. Schultz in fact took place. The trial court abused its discretion in 
determining that the alleged conversation between Jorgensen and Mr. Schultz ever took 
place, without requiring the defendants and Jorgensen to provide any evidence supporting 
Jorgensen's false claim that the alleged conversation took place. If the alleged 
conversation between Mr. Schultz and Jorgensen actually took place, the defendants and 
Jorgensen have the ability to prove that it took place. Ms. Pett cannot prove a negative, 
i.e.. that the alleged conversation did not take place. However, she can prove that Mr. 
Schultz never initiated any calls to Jorgensen and the Mr. Schultz never personally met 
with Jorgensen during the time period that the defendants and Jorgensen claim that the 
alleged oral conversation took place. 
Because the defendants and Jorgensen have not proven, and cannot prove, that any 
oral conversation between Jorgensen and Mr. Schultz ever took place during the time 
period when the defendants and Jorgensen claim that she entered into the oral agreement 
with Mr. Schultz whereby the defendants would simply send Ms. Pett do-it-yourself 
reconveyance forms, the trial court abused its discretion and erred as a matter of law in 
granting the defendants' motion to disqualify Mr. Schultz as counsel for Ms. Pett. 
Therefore, Ms. Pett is entitled to have this court reverse the trial court's ruling granting 
the defendants' motion to disqualify Mr. Schultz as counsel for Ms. Pett. 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN FAILING TO GRANT 
MS. PETTS MOTION TO STRIKE THE MEMORANDUM OF THE APPELLEES 
IN OPPOSITION TO MS. PETTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Although ihe trial court clearly and unequovically ignored the applicable 
provisions of the URCP and the UCJA when computing the time period in which the 
appellees had to respond to Ms. Pett's Motion for Summary Judgment, and applied one 
standard for service of documents and calculation of time to Ms. Pett and a different 
standard for service of documents and calculation of time to the defendant, thereby, 
improperly denying Ms. Pett's Motion to Strike the appellees' memorandum in 
opposition to Ms. Pett's Motion for Summary Judgment. The trial court had the discretion 
under Rule 6(b) URCP to permit accept the defendant's late filing, and, therefore, this 
Court can uphold the trial court's denial of Ms. Pett's Motion to Strike based on other 
grounds, even though the trial court's denial of Ms. Pett's Motion to strike clearly 
manifests the bias and prejudice of the trial court against Ms. Pett and her counsel. Ms. 
Pett, therefore, respectfully dismiss her claim with respect to her claim for denial of her 
Motion to Strike. 
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOn RELIEF 
The trial court erred when it granted the defendants' Rule 12 (b)(6) Motion. The 
trial court improperly and unlawfully considered matters outside of Ms. Pett's complaint 
when it granted the defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion. The trial court improperly and 
unlawfully made findings of facts in granting the defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion. 
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Even if the trial court had decided the defendants9 Rule 12(b)(6) motion under the 
standard for summary judgment specified in Rule 56 URCP, the trial court's improperly 
and unlawfully made findings of facts and granted the defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion 
based on those improper and inaccurate findings of fact. Therefore, Ms. Pett is entitled to 
have this Court issue an order reversing the trial court's grant of the defendants' Rule 12 
(b) (6) motion. 
The trial court also committed prejudicial and reversible error when it granted the 
defendants' motion to disqualify Mr. Schultz as counsel for Ms. Pett. The trial court 
improperly determined that Mr. Schultz in fact had a conversation with Jorgensen 
wherein Mr. Schultz agreed that the defendants could simply send do-it-yourself forms to 
Ms. Pett so that she could have the defendants' trust deed reconveyed, rather than 
requiring the defendants to reconvey the trust deed to Ms. Pett, as required by Utah law. 
The defendants did not produce any evidence, and cannot produce any evidence, 
establishing that any conversation between Mr. Schultz and Jorgensen ever took place as 
alleged by Jorgensen in her perjured affidavit. The trial court improperly assumed that 
Jorgensen's perjury was true and improperly disqualified Mr. Schultz as counsel for Ms. 
Pett without requiring any proof that the alleged conversation took place. Therefore, Ms. 
Pett is entitled to have this Court reverse the trial court's order disqualifying Mr. Schultz 
as counsel for Ms. Pett and require that the defendants provide proof that the alleged 
conversation between Mr. Schultz and Jorgensen ever occurred. 
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WHEREFORE, Ms. Pett respectfully moves this Court for an order reversing the 
trial court's decision granting the defendants' Rule 12 (b)(6) motion and granting the 
defendants' motion to disqualify Mr. Schultz as counsel for Ms. Pett. Ms. Pett also 
request that she be awarded her costs and attorney's fees incurred in prosecuting this 
appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this .' - day of October 2003. 
/ ' j K ^ - " / 
^ ^ ^ l^, - >-' ^ S ^ v ^ 
Charles A. Schultz 
Attorney for Sheri Pett 
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Marlon L. Bates 
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Charles A. Schultz, (4760) 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
222 West 7,h South 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, BRIGHAM CITY DEPARTMENT 
—oooOooo— 
SHERI COLLEEN PETT, : 
COMPLAINT 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : Civil No. C^JC'CJ^fS 
FLEET MORTGAGE CORPORATION, : 
WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK, 
: Judge: 
Defendants. 
—oooOooo— 
COiVIES NOW, the Plaintiff and complains and alleges of the 
above-named Defendant for cause as follows: 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1. The Plaintiff is, and at all times herein pertinent was, a 
resident of Box Elder County, State of Utah. 
2. The defendant Fleet Mortgage Corporation (hereinafter, 
"Fleet") is a foreign corporation transacting business in the state of 
Utah. 
CCOLQi 
3. The defendant Washington Mutual Bank (hereinafter, 
^Washington") is a foreign corporation transacting business in the 
state of Utah. 
4. The real property that is the subject of this action is 
located in Box Elder County, Utah. 
5. Jurisdiction is proper vested in this Court pursuant to the 
provisions of Utah Code Annotated, Sections 78-3-4 and 13-11-6(1). 
6. Venue is properly laid in First District Court of Box Elder 
County pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-13-7. 
GENERAL ALLEGA TIONS 
7. The Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 6 of her 
Complaint and incorporates them herein as if fully set forth by this 
reference. 
8. The Plaintiff Sheri Pett (hereinafter, "Ms. Pett") is the 
owner of certain real property located in Box Elder County, Utah, 
located at 224 West 700 South, Brigham City, Utah. 
9. The Defendants Fleet Mortgage Company and/or Washington 
Mutual 3ank are successors in interest to a deed of trust executed by 
the Plaintiff and her brother Robert Pett to Eagle National Mortgage. 
10. On November 20, 2001, the Plaintiff gave Judy Jorgensen, 
Scott Lundberg and/or Lundberg & Associates (hereinafter collectivaly 
referred to as "Lundberg") who were acting as legal counsel for Fleet 
and/cr Washington, a cashier's check in the amount of $56,629.91 as 
full payment for all indebtedness of any nature whatsoever with respect 
to any claims by Fleet, Washington and/or their successors in interest 
and/cr assigns in Ms. Pett's property. A copy of that cashier's check 
is attached to this Complaint as Exhibit A. A notarized copy of the 
receipt for payment is attached to this Complaint as Exhibit B. 
11. Prior to delivery of Exhibit A to Lundberg, Ms. Pett 
requested that a deed of reconveyance be prepared and given to her at 
the lime she paid the referenced $56,629.91 to Lundberg. 
12. Jorgensen, however, refused to provide Ms. Pett with a deed 
of reconveyance at the time of payment, in spite of the fact that Ms. 
Pett paid Lundberg with a cashier's check, and rather than providing 
Ms. Pett with a deed of reconveyance Jorgensen told Ms. Pett she would 
not Jive Ms. Pett a deed cf reconveyance and that if Ms. Pett did not 
get a deed of reconveyance she could sue to get one. A copy of 
Jorgensen's letter is attached to this Complaint as Exhibit C. 
13. Ms. Pett paid the referenced $56,629.91 to Lundberg as a part 
of a stipulated settleme2it in case No. 990100647, filed in the First 
Judicial District Court cf Utah, Box Eider County. A copy of that 
settlement agreement is attached to this Complaint as Exhibit D. 
14. Utah Law requires that a trustee record a reconveyance of 
trust deed within 90 days after the note securing the trust deed has 
been paid. Therefore, Fleet: and/or Washington were required to record 
the reconveyance of Ms. Pezz's property to her no later than February 
18, 2002. 
15. As of the date of filing of this Complaint, no reconveyance 
has been filed by Fleet, Washington, Lundberg and/or Jorgensen. 
FIRST CA USE OF ACTION 
(Violation of Utah Trust Deed Statute) 
16. The Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 15 of her 
Complaint and incorporates them herein as if fully set forth by this 
reference. 
17. The defendants are required by the provisions of UCA §57-1-
38(3) to file a reconveyance of trust deed to Ms. Pett within 90 days 
of the date she paid, in full, the stipulated settlement amount to 
Fleet, Washington and/or their successors in interest and/or assigns. 
18. Ms. Pett paid Fleet, Washington and/or their successors m 
interest and/or assigns in full, according to the terms specified in 
Exhibit D, on November 2C, 2001. 
19. Under the express provisions of UCA §57-1-38(3), Fleet, 
Washington and/or their successors in interest and/or assigns, 
Jorgensen and/or Lundberc were required to record a deed of 
reconveyance re-vesting all right: title and interest in Ms. Pert'5^  
property to her no later than February 18, 2002. 
COCK n4 
20. The defendants have knowingly, intentionally, maliciously and 
contumaciously failed and refused to record a deed of reconveyance re-
vesting all right title and interest in Ms. Pett's property to her in 
direct violation of UCA §57-1-33(3). 
21. Because the defendants have knowingly, intentionally, 
maliciously and contumaciously failed and refused to record a deed of 
reconveyance re-vesting all right title and interest in Ms. Pett's 
property to her, Ms- Pett is entitled to an order from this Court 
compelling Fleet, Washington and/or their successors in interest and/or 
assigns, Jorgensen and/or Lundberg to record a deed of reconveyance re-
vesting all right title and interest in Ms. Pettfs property to her. 
22• Because the defendants have knowingly, intentionally, 
maliciously and- contumaciously failed and refused to record a deed of 
reconveyance re-vesting all right title and interest in Ms. Pett's 
property to her, Ms. Pett is entitled to recover her court costs and 
attorney's fees incurred in litigating this case. 
23. Because the defendants have knowingly, intentionally, 
maliciously and contumaciously failed and refused to record a deed of 
reconveyance re-vesting all right title and interest in Ms. Pett's 
property to her, Ms. Pett is entitled to recover statutory damages in 
the amount of $1,000.00 as per UCA §57-1-38(3)(a). 
24. Because the defendants have knowingly, intentionally, 
-S-
maliciously and contumaciously failed and refused to record a deed of 
reconveyance re-vesting all right title and interest in Ms. Pett's 
property to her, Ms. Pett is entitled to recover punitive damages in an 
amount to be determined at trial of this matter. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Slander of Title) 
25. The Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 24 of her 
Complaint and incorporates them herein as if fully set forth by this 
reference• 
26. On November 20, 2001, the Plaintiff gave Lundberg who were 
acting as legal counsel for Fleet and/or Washington, a cashier's check 
in the amount of $56,629.91 as full payment for all indebtedness of any 
nature whatsoever with respect the any claims by Fleet, Washington 
and/or their successors in interest and/or assigns in Ms. Pett's 
property. 
27. Utah Law requires that a trustee record a reconveyance of 
Trust deed within 90 days after the note securing the trust deed has 
been paid. Therefore, Fleet and/or Washington were required to record 
the reconveyance of Ms. Pett's property to her no later than February 
IS, 2002. 
28. As of the date of filing cf this Complaint, no reconveyance 
has been filed by Fleet and/or Washington. 
29. Fleet, Washington and/or their successors in interest and/or 
assigns have been paid in full pursuant to the stipulation as set forth 
in Exhibit D. to this Complaint. 
30. Because Fleet, Washington and/or their successors in interest 
and/or assigns have been paid in full pursuant to the stipulation as 
set forth in Exhibit D, they can claim no legal or equitable interest 
in Ms. Pett's property. 
31. By failing to release their deed of trust against Ms. Pett's 
property, Fleet and/or Washington are continuing to assert that they 
have an interest in Ms. Pelt's property, by way of the trust deed filed 
and recorded with the Box Eider County Recorder. 
32. By continuing tc assert an interest in Ms. Pett's property, 
Fleet, Washington and/or their successors in interest and/or assigns 
are slandering Ms. Pett's litle to her property. 
33. As a direct and proximate result of Fleet, Washington and/or 
their successors in interest and/or assigns the slander of title, Ms. 
Pett is unable to mortgage, pledge or hypothecate her property. 
34. As a direct and proximate result of Fleet, Washington and/or 
their successors in interest and/or assigns the slander of title, r.as 
been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial of this matter. 
35. Because Fleet, Washington and/or their successors in interest 
and/or assigns have no legal interest in Ms. Pett's property, Ms. Pett 
-7-
is entitled to an order from this court quieting title in her name. 
36. Because Fleet, Washington and/or their successors in interest 
and/or assigns have knowingly, intentionally, maliciously and 
contumaciously continued to assert an interest in Ms. Pettfs property, 
Ms. Pett, Ms. Pett is entitled to recover her court costs and 
attorney's fees incurred in litigating this case. 
37. Because Fleet, Washington and/or their successors in interest 
and/or assigns have knowingly, intentionally, maliciously and 
contumaciously continued to assert an interest in Ms. Pett's property, 
Ms. Pett is entitled to recover punitive damages in an amount to be 
determined at trial of this matter. 
WHEREFORE, Ms. Pett prays for relief as follows: 
On her First Cause of Action-
1. For an order compelling Fleet, Washington and/or their 
successors in interest and/or assigns to file and record a deed of 
reconveyance re-vesting all right title and interest in her property to 
Ms. Pett; or in the alternative an order from this Court declaring that 
Fleet, Washington and/or their successors in interest and/or assigns 
have no interest of any nature whatsoever in Ms. property. 
2. For an order awarding Ms. Pett her courts and other costs 
incurred in litigating this matter, as provided for in UCA §57-1-
38(3) (b) . 
UOOl08 
3. For an order awarding Ms. Pett her attorney's fees incurred 
in litigating this matter, as provided for in UCA §57-1-38(3) (b) . 
4. For an order awarding Ms. Pett statutory damages as provided 
for in UCA §57-1-38 (3) (a) . 
$» For treble actual damages incurred by Ms. Pett, as determined 
at trial of this matter. 
6. For post judgment interest at the maximum legal rate until 
judgment in this matter is satisfied. 
7. For punitive damages as determined at trial of this matter. 
$• For such further and additional relief as the Court deems 
just &nd proper in this matter. 
On her Second Cause of Action: 
1. For an order quieting title in Ms. Pett. 
2. For an order awarding Ms. Pett her court and other costs 
incurred in litigating this matter. 
3. For an order awarding Ms. Pett her attorney's fees incurred 
in litigating this matter. 
4. For actual damages incurred by Ms. Pett, as determined at 
trial of this matter. 
5. For post judgment interest at the maximum legal rate until 
judgment in this matter is satisfied. 
$. For punitive damages as determined at trial of this matter. 
( (sm n Q 
7. For such further and additional relief as the Court deems 
just and proper in this matter* 
Dated this &h of September 2002. 
Charles Schultz 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Plaintiffs Address; 
Sheri Pett 
224 West 7* South 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
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'Suant to the Corrected Stipulation of the parties filed with the First District Court in case No. 990100647, 
undersigned representative of Lundberg and Associates, Fleet Mortgage Company and Washington Mutual 
eby accepts and acknowledges the receipt of a cashier's check in the amount of $56,629.91, a copy of which 
n this Receipt, in full settlement and release of all claims against Sheri Pett, Robert Pett and the real property 
ited at 224 West 700 South Britain City, Box Elder County, Utah, more properly described as follows: 
Beginning at a point 82.5 feet East from the Southwest Corner of Lot 1, Block 16, Plat B, 
Brigham City Survey, thence East 82.5 feet, more or less to center of said Lot 1, thence 
North 132 feet, thence West 82 5 feet, more or less to a point due North of the point of 
beginning, thence South 132 feet to the point of beginning. 
tiding all claims in any way whatsoever relating to loan #4799596 to Fleet Mortgage Company and'or its 
>ns or successors in interest. 
Dated this W* day of November 2001. 
\ 
> 
ubscnBed io in my presence this day of November 200] 
J/^?:^ //t-\U-Js'l&"«C.'- _ L ^ S ^ \ A^ V MCDONALD i 
rv 
-it;. ' ' J
 : 
Murray Utah #.1 i f / » 
s'\yry. «>- : >..* ; 
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Peterwatts 
From: "Judy Jorgensen" <Judy@lundbergfirm.com> 
To: <peterwatts@networld.com> 
Sent: Friday, November 16, 2001 3:55 PM 
Subject: Re: Petts v. Fleet Mortgage L&A No. x0320 
Dear Mr. Shultz, 
Again I have to face a nasty e-mail from you which again demonstrates your misunderstanding of the 
foreclosure process. I am not the trustee under the deed of trust and therefore cannot sign the 
document. Upon receipt of the funds, my client will request the reconveyance from the trustee and if the 
trustee does not do so, there is a cause of action in the Utah Trust Deed Statute under which you may sue 
to have it done. This is the procedure throughout the industry and I suggest that you check it out if you 
do not believe me. Further, the stipulation language which you prepared does not call for the execution 
of the deed of reconveyance at the same time as the receipt of the funds. It is however implied and will 
be done by my client, who has been the only party in this matter to be reasonable. I do not approve of 
the way that you choose to practice law, but you are more than welcome to place the funds with the 
court and file whatever you wish to. If I do not have the funds in my office on the date stipulated to, my 
client will be entitled to foreclosure, as agreed. 
> » "peterwatts" <peterwatts@networld.com> 11/16 9:22 AM > » 
Original Message 
From: "Judy Jorgensen" <Judy@lundbergfirm.com> 
To: <Julie@lundbergfirm.com>; <peterwatts@networld.com> 
Sent: Friday, November 16, 2001 8:59 AM 
Subject: Re: Petts v. Fleet Mortgage L&A No. x0320 
Dear Mr. Shultz, 
I have been in rescheduled depositions the last two days and may still be 
there today. My paralegal would be more than happy to accept the payoff 
funds on this matter, to be distributed to my client along with the funds 
that I have received from the court. Once the money has been sent to my 
client, they will request the reconveyance of the trust deed from the 
trustee, which will be recorded. 1 am sure I can get you a copy of the 
recorded deed of reconveyance after filing. If you wish to wait until that 
is done before submitting the dismissal of this matter, that would be okay. 
Please remember that the funds must be in a certified cashiers check so that 
the disbursement is not delayed. 
Bull Shit! 
You will give us the reconveyance at the time you receive the money. 
Otherwise we will never get it. Your clients have done nothing but lie for 
ten \ ears. If we pay you the money without receiving the reconveyance, we 
will have to sue to get it. 
If there is no reconveyance at the time you receive the money. 1 will pay 
the money to the Court to prove my clients have complied with the 
Stipulation but your clients refuse to abide by it. 
If you have authority to accept payment on behalf of your client, you have 
authority to issue the reconveyance. f ) rwi r> 
Charles A Schultz, (4760) 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
PO Box 756 
Heber City, Utah 84032 
Telephone (801)530-5636 U P 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY _ 
STATE OF UTAH, BRIGHAM CITY DEPARTMENT ^ 
—oooOooo— 
SHERI COLLEEN PETT and : 
ROBERT J. PETT, : 
Plaintiffs, : 
vs 
FLEET MORTGAGE CORPORATION, 
Judge: Clint Judkins 
Defendant. 
CORRECTED STIPULATION 
: Civil No. 990100647CN 
-oooOooo— 
COME NOW, the undersigned parties hereby and agree and stipulate as follows* 
1 The total amount owed to Fleet Mortgage Company and or its successors 
and/or assigns is a $77,680.29. 
2 Fleet Mortgage Company also agrees to credit the Pett's account in the 
amount of $6490.38. 
3. The Petts have paid $14,560.00 in mortgage payments to the First District 
Court; those funds will be immediately released to Fleet Mortgage. 
4. Deducting the S6490.38 and the $14,560 00 paid to the First District Court 
from the $77,680 29 owed to Fleet Mortgage Company and/or its successors and/or 
assigns leaves in a total amount owing to Fleet Mortgage of $56,629.91. 
5. The parties hereby agree and stipulate that the Petts will pay to Fleet 
Mortgage the entire $56,629.91 by cashier's check made payable to Lundberg & 
Associates on or before 5:00 p.m. on November 21, 2001 ,at 3269 South Main Street 
Suite 100, Salt Lake City, Utah 84115. 
6. All parties to this Stipulation agree and stipulate that all payments made by 
plainitffs in conjunction with this Note currently being held by the court be released to 
defendant 
7. All parties to this Stipulation hereby agree and stipulate to the issuance of an 
Order for Release of Funds, filed in conjunction herewith, and to the cancellation of the 
jury trial set for October 30, 2001 through November 2, 2001. 
8. If the Petts fail to pay the entire $56,629.91 as set forth above, upon 
application to the Court by defendant, Fleet Mortgage will be entitled to judgment in this 
case in the amount of $56,629.91 and for foreclosure of the Note and may immediately 
proceed with foreclosure of the property that is the subject of this litigation, more 
particularly described as: 
Beginning at a point 82.5 feet East from the Southwest Corner of Lot 1, Block 16, 
Plat B, Brigham City Survey, thence East 82.5 feet, more or less to center of said 
Lot 1, thence North 132 feet, thence West 82.5 feet, more or less to a point due 
North of the point of beginning, thence South 132 feet to the point of beginning. 
9. Upon receipt by Fleet and/or its successors and/or assigns of the referenced 
$56,766.14, this case will be jointly dismissed with prejudice by both parties with both 
parties to bear their own cost and attorney's fees incurred. 
10. Upon dismissal of this case both parties expressly agree and stipulate that 
they are releasing all the claims and causes of actions, of any nature whatsoever, that 
they may have against one another for any transaction, occurrence or event that may 
have occurred prior to the date of the dismissal, whether or not the parties have 
knowledge of such transaction occurrence or event and even if knowledge of any such 
transaction occurrence or event would have affected their decision to enter into this 
Stipulation. 
11. This Stipulation embodies the entire agreement for payment to Fleet and for 
the dismissal of this case and this Stipulation may be modified only in writing signed by 
both parties 
12. The undersigned attorneys, by their signatures below, certify that they have 
authority to execute this Stipulation and enter into this Stipulation on behalf of their 
respective clients. 
Dated this " / day of October 2001 
Charles A. Shultz 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
LUNDBERG & ASSOCIATES 
/ 
By: ' S"£^ ^^^^-tcx 
. JudytJorgerisen / 
Attorrreys^for Defendant 
y^i^J^k 
i \ f i \ i AC^ 
Marlon L. Bates (4794) 
William G. Wilson (8787) 
SCALLEY & READING, P.C. 
Attorneys for Washington Mutual Bank, FA 
Successor-in-interest to Fleet Mortgage Corporation 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7870 
Facsimile: (801) 531-7968 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SHERI COLLEEN PETT, 
Plaintiff, 
FLEET MORTGAGE CORPORATION, 
WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JUDY JORGENSEN 
Civil No. 020100793 
Judge Hadfleld 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
1. I am an associate attorney with Lundberg & Associates. 
2* In mid-November, 2001,1 was handling a judicial foreclosure matter for my client, 
Washington Mutual Bank, concerning certainreal property situated inBrigham City for which Sheri Colleen 
Pett and Robert Pett ("the Petts") were the borrowers under a Deed of Trust and Note and were the 
plaintiffs in the matter of Shed Colleen Pett and Robert Pett v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., Civil No. 
990100647, filed in the First District Court, Box Elder County, State of Utah. 
3 • The dispute involved certain issues as to the amount due and owing under the Deed ofTrust 
and Note under which Washington Mutual was the current beneficiary, including a dispute over the 
crediting of certain payments allegedly made by the Petts. 
4. The Petts were represented by Charles A. Schultz ("Schultz") in the proceeding, who was 
practicing out of Wasatch County, Utah. 
5. A settlement agreement was reached between the parties concerning the amount due to 
Washington Mutual on the Deed ofTrust and Note, which was reduced to writing and filed with the First 
District Court in settlement of the case. 
6. Through several e-mail communications and telephone conversations, Schultz expressed 
his desire to have the reconveyance of the deed of trust on the Petts' property delivered at the same time 
as the payoff funds were tendered to plaintiffs counsel. See Exhibit "A" (e-mail printouts). 
7. I explained to him in my e-mail that the procedure for reconveyances requires that the 
payoff funds be first received by the beneficiary, i.e., Washington Mutual, and that after the funds are 
received and credited, the beneficiary then sends a request for a reconveyance to the current trustee, who 
then executes a Deed of Reconveyance and records it in the county recorder's office for the county in 
which the property is located. Lundberg & Associates would not ordinarily be involved in handling 
reconveyances of deeds of trust unless one of its attorneys was the trustee under the deed of trust, which 
we were not in this instance. There would necessarily be some delay between the tender of the payoff 
2 
funds and the reconveyance of the Deed of Trust and therefore, my office could not control the timing of 
the transaction. I explained that this was standard procedure in the mortgage industry. See Id 
8. Schultz was dissatisfied with my explanation as to why I could not have the trust deed 
reconveyed immediately and threatened to not deliver the payoff check on the date specified in the 
Stipulation to my office for forwarding to the client, but to deposit it in the court instead, as evidenced by 
the e-mail correspondence. 
9« To appease his insistence for an immediate reconveyance, we agreed verbally, and with 
the agreement ofWashington Mutual, that Washington Mutual would execute a Request for Reconveyance 
and a Substitution of Trustee and forward it to me for delivery to him so the Petts could facilitate the 
reconveyance at their own timing. At Schultz's request, the documents were to be sent directly to the Petts, 
rather than to him, because his office was in Heber, which is several hours away from Brigham City, where 
the property and the Petts were located. Schultz also mentioned that he was getting out of the practice of 
law. 
!()• I agreed to obtain a request for reconveyance and substitution of trustee from Washington 
Mutual as soon as reasonably possible, and to forward those documents to the Petts directly. 
11. At no time during these transactions did I communicate directly with the Petts without the 
presence of their counsel. 
12* As soon as I received the documents from Washington Mutual, I forwarded them to the 
Petts in Brigham City. The documents were sent via UPS, next day air, and were delivered January 9, 
2002. The documents were accompanied by a letter to the Petts, instructing them as to the steps necessary 
3 
to have the documents executed and recorded. See Exhibit "B" (Documents and UPS tracking 
information). 
13. I had no further communications from either Schultz or the Petts, even in regards to any 
complaints about the reconveyance. 
14. On or about August 19,2002, Phillips Hansen Land Title Company, the original trustee 
for the Deed of Trust, caused a Deed of Reconveyance to be filed in the Box Elder County Recorder5 s 
office, reconveying the property to the Petts. See Exhibit "C." 
15. I do not know what actions were taken by the Petts after receipt of the documents for 
reconveyance or why it took the Petts or the title company over eight months from receipt of the Request 
for Reconveyance to have the Deed of Trust reconveyed. However, I do know that Washington Mutual 
fulfilled its obligations under the Stipulation and that Washington Mutual and I cooperated with Mr. Schultz 
fully and completely in facilitating the reconveyance of the property, and that the Petts and/or Phillips 
Hansen Land Title Company were fully empowered to control the reconveyance after January 9, 2002. 
16. Further, despite the terms of the Stipulation having been fully performed by Washington 
Mutual in Pett v. Fleet Mortgage Corp.x no dismissal of the case has ever been entered or requested by 
the Petts, as evidenced by the court record. 
DATED this / (j day of December, 2002. 
f
 f.uL& /r^^y.jyu^^ 
Judy Jtorgensen A 
4 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this day of December, 2002. 
(SEA 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
JULIE RASMUSSEN 
3815 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Commission Expires 
November 9 2004 
STATE OF UTAH tary Public 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF JUDY 
JORGENSEN was served upon counsel of record by depositing the same in the United States mail, 
postage prepaid and addressed as follows: 
Charles A. Schultz 
222 West 700 South 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
Tricing,; o% T 
OOOl21 
AFFIDAVIT 
STATE OF UTAH } 
ss. 
COUNTY OF BOX ELDER } 
Sheri Pett being first sworn on her oath states as follows: 
1. I, Sheri Pett, have personal knowledge of the facts set forth in this affidavit and I would testify 
to the same if I were called to do so by the court. 
2 I have read the affidavit of Judy Jorgensen submitted in case No. 020100793 in the First District 
Court. 
3. Paragraphs 9 and 10 of Jorgensen's affidavit are lies. 
4. Mr. Schultz never requested that Jorgensen send any documents to my brother or me. In fact 
Mr. Schultz did not want us to pay the settlement money to Jorgensen on November 20, 2001. 
5. Right up until the time we actually gave Jorgensen's assistant the settlement check, Mr. Schultz 
was trying to convince us to pay the money into the court and file a motion to compel Jorgensen to give us 
a deed of reconveyance. 
6. Mr. Schultz always told us that if we did not get a deed of reconveyance when we gave 
Jorgensen the settlement check we would have to sue to get one. 
7. At the time my brother and I went to Jorgensen's office to give them the settlement payment, 
Mr. Schultz refused to give Jorgensen's assistant the settlement check until he received a signed and 
notarized receipt for the settlement check. 
8. Mr. Schultz would not even permit Jorgensen's assistant to hold the settlement check until he 
received the signed and notarized receipt. 
9. When Jorgensen5 s assistant brought the receipt back after having it notarized, Mr. Schultz took 
the receipt with his left hand and gave Jorgensen's assistant the settlement with his right hand. Mr Schultz 
would not let go of the settlement check until he had the receipt in his hand. That is how much trust Mr. 
Schultz had in Jorgensen and Fleet. 
10. Every month after we paid Jorgensen the settlement check, Mr. Schultz would tell us to check 
with the county recorder to see if Fleet and/or Washington Mutual had filed a reconveyance, which we did 
and Fleet never filed a reconveyance. 
11. If Mr. Schultz had entered into any agreement with Jorgensen about sending forms to my 
brother and me, he would have told us about it, and he would not have kept telling us to check with the 
county recorder to see if a reconveyance had been filed. 
12. Mr. Schultz would never have entered into any veii>a! agreement with Jorgensen or Fleet for 
anything. He always told us everything had to be in writing because we could not trust anything Jorgensen 
or Fleet had to say. 
Dated this qiy* day of December 2002. 
hi: iV 
Sheri Pett 
Sworn and subscribed to this 2 ^ day of December 2002. 
AFFIDAVIT 
STATE OF UTAH } 
ss. 
COUNTY OF BOX ELDER} 
Robert Pett being first sworn on his oath states as follows: 
1. I, Robert Pett, have personal knowledge of the facts set forth in this affidavit and I would 
testify to the same if I were called to do so by the court. 
2. I have read the affidavit of Judy Jorgensen submitted in case No. 020100793 in the First District 
Court. 
3. Paragraphs 9 and 10 of Jorgensen's affidavit are lies. 
4. Mr. Schultz never requested that Jorgensen send any documents to me or to my sister. In fact 
Mr. Schultz did not want us to pay the settlement money to Jorgensen on November 20, 2001. 
5. Right up until the time we actually gave Jorgensen's assistant the settlement check, Mr. Schultz 
was trying to convince us to pay the money into the court and file a motion to compel Jorgensen to give us 
a deed of reconveyance. 
6. Mr. Schultz always told us that if we did not get a deed of reconveyance when we gave 
Jorgensen the settlement check we would have to sue to get one. 
7. At the time my sister and I went to Jorgensen's office to give them the settlement payment, Mr. 
Schultz refused to give Jorgensen's assistant the settlement check until he received a signed and notarized 
receipt for the settlement check. 
8. Mr. Schultz would not even permit Jorgensen's assistant to hold the settlement check until he 
received the signed and notarized receipt. 
u
 When Jorgensen's assistant brought the receipt back after having it notarized, Mr Schultz took 
the receipt with his left hand and gave Jorgensen's assistant the settlement with his right hand. Mr. Schi iltz 
would not let go of the settlement check until he had the receipt in his hand. That is how much trust Mr. 
Schultz had in Jorocnsen and Fleet. 
10. Every month after we paid Jorgensen the settlement check, Mr. Schultz would tell us to check 
with the county recorder to see if Fleet and/or Washington Mutual had filed a reconveyance, which we did 
and Fleet never filed a reconveyance. 
11 If Mi Schultz had entered into any agreement with Jorgensen about sending forms to my 
sistei ,IIK1 mo. h< \sould have told us about it ami lit would noi luvi t opt leilm;.. u> to rfieck «^IL mo 
county recorder to see if a reconveyance had been filed. 
12. Mr. Schultz would never have entered into any verbal agreement with Jorgensen or Fleet for 
anything. He always told us everything had to h- in wriunii because wo could not trust anything jorgensen 
or Fleet had to say. 
Dated this
 r#g^*day of December 2002. 
Sworn and subscribed to this 2 0 day of December 2002. 
AFFIDAVIT 
STATE OF UTAH } 
ss. 
COUNTY OF BOX ELDER } 
Charles Schultz being first sworn on his oath states as follows: 
1. I, Charles Schultz, have personal knowledge of the facts set forth in this affidavit and I would 
testify to the same if I were called to do so by the court. 
2. I have read the affidavit of Judy Jorgensen submitted in case No. 020100793 in the First District 
Court. 
3. Paragraphs 9 and .10 of Jorgensen's affidavit are blatant lies. 
4. I never sent any correspondence to Jorgensen subsequent to my November 16, 2001, 8:59 a.m. 
email to her. 
5. The last communication I received from Jorgensen was her reply to my November 16, 2001 
email, sent by Jorgensen at 2:55 p.m. 
6. I never had any verbal communications with Jorgensen on November 16, 2001 or any time 
thereafter. 
6. The conversation Jorgensen claims we had, wherein we agreed "that Washington Mutual would 
execute a Request for Reconveyance and a Substitution of Trustee" never occurred. Therefore, I never 
requested that any documents be sent to the Petts. 
7. I cannot prove a negative, i.e., that the alleged conversation with Jorgensen never took place, 
but my phone records will prove that at no time on November 16, 2001 or at any time 
thereafter , did I e\ ei place a phone call to Jorgensen or anyone at I .undberg and Associates. ;. 
8 From the time Jorgensen first became involved in case No. 1 990100647, filed in the 
First District Court:, she lied about dates she filed documents and lied about sending documents to me. 
Therefore, I never believed anything she ever said, and I would have never trusted her to do anything based 
on a verbal agreement. 
9. Nothing with Jorgensen was evei done that \»v as not documented in wr iting because I could not 
trust her to do anything she said she would do. 
I n
 If I had entered into any type of agreement with Jorgensen about anything, it would have been 
in writing and signed. 
II I know Jorgensen is a liar and I would never trust her to abide by any verbal agreement. 
V1\ ini','1 foi anything that Jorgensen oi any of Fleet1*? attorneys said oi did was so low that 
when my clients, the Petts, and I went to Jorgensen5 s office and met with her assistant to make the 
settlement payment, I had prepared a receipt for the payment, and I insisted that the receipt be signed and 
notarized before I would physically transfer the cashier's check to Jorgensen's associate. Jorgensen's 
assistant signed the receipt got it notarized and she gave me the receipt with one hand and I gave her the 
13. I would never have entered into any verbal agreement with Jorgensen for anything because 
know she is a liar, and you cannot trust anything she says. 
14. If an.} agreement with Jorgensen had been entered into oi any conversation had been held with 
her it would have been memorialized in writing. I would have conformed it in writing because I know 
Jorgensen is a liar, and she would have confirmed it in writing because as she stated in her last 
communication with me, she "does not approve of the way I practice law." 
15. There is no written communication regarding the alleged verbal agreement because there was 
no verbal agreement and no conversation with Jorgensen on November 16, 2001 or at anytime thereafter. 
16. If I had entered into the verbal agreement as Jorgensen claims, I would never have filed suit 
against Fleet and/or Washington Mutual for failure to reconvey title to Ms. Petf s property. 
n 
Dated this — ^ day of December 2002. 
Charles Schultz 
Sworn and subscribed to this ZO day of December 2002. 
Notary![JP-ublic 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
JfLLK. KELSON 
156 South Mam Street 
S B'ighar^Cn\,Ui 84302 
My Commission Expires 
March 31, 2006 
STATE OF UTAH 
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IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SHERI COLLEEN PETT, * MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff; * 
FLEET MORTGAGE CORPORATION, * =. M<- SO.: 020100793 
WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK, * 
* Judge Clint S. Judkins 
Defendant. * 
THIS CASE is before the court on several motions. There are notices to submit filed on 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant's Motion to Disqualify Plaintiffs 
i\ltoirr\. Plaintiffs Motion to Stiikc (Defendant's response to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment), Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, and Plaintiff's Motion to 
Strike (Defendant's reply to Plaintiffs response memorandum to Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss). The Court notes thai the matter of Plaintiff s MDI.IOII to Disqualify Judge Hadfield had 
to be dealt with before this case could be reassigned, and further action could be taken. 
The Court will deal with the notice to submit most distant in time and work forward to 
the most recent Therefore, Plaintiff s Motion lot Summary Jmlnmenl will be ruled upon first 
However, because the Court's decision concerning Plaintiffs Motion to Strike (Defendant's 
Response to Motion for Summary Judgment) may affect the Court's decision concerning 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs Motion to Strike will be disposed nf at- a 
preliminary matter. 
Plaintiff argues that Defendant's response was not timely under Rule 4-501, Utah Rules 
of Judicial Administration.1 Plaintiff moves the Court to strike Defendant's response. Defendant 
responds through a memorandum in opposition that its response was timely filed pursuant to 
Rule 4-5012, and Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 6. 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment was filed with the Court and date-stamped 
December 2, 2002. The certificate of service included with Plaintiffs Memorandum states that 
Plaintiff served a copy of the motion and memorandum on November 30, 2002. 
Defendant filed its response with the Court on December 18,2002. The certificate of 
service accompanying Defendant's memorandum is dated December 16, 2002, and states that the 
document was mailed on that day. 
For these purposes, time is computed under the guidelines of Rule 6, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure* Defendant had ten days from December 2, 2002 to serve and file a response 
memorandum.3 The day of service is not counted.4 Also, because the period of time is less than 
eleven days, "intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays shall be excluded in the 
]See Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, 4-501(l)(B), "The responding party shall file 
and serve upon all parties within ten days after service of a motion, a memorandum in opposition 
to the motion, and all supporting documentation. If the responding party fails to file a 
memorandum in opposition to the motion within ten days after service of the motion, the moving 
party may notify the clerk to submit the matter to the court for decision...." 
2
 Id. 
'See Rule 4-501(l)(B),". . .within ten days of service..." 
AUtah Rules of Civil Procedure 6(a) ".. .the day of the act, event, or default from which 
the designated period of time begins to run shall not be included." 
2 
computation."5 And, if service is accomplished by mail, an additional three days are added to the 
time.6 
Calculating the ten day time period under Rule 6, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Defendant had until December 19, 2002 to file its response. Defendant sen ed its response on 
December 16, 2002 and filed the same with the Court on December 18, 2002. Therefore, 
Plaintiffs Motion to Strike (Defendant's response to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment) 
is denied. 
Now to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. Pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 56, summary judgment is appropriate if " . . . there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Case law • 
instructs the court to view the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party's 
position.7 Also, "[Summary] Judgment should only be granted when it appears 'there is no 
reasonable probatulih that the party moved against could prevail'"8 
In this case there is a question whether the defenses of Utah Code Annotated 57-1-38(4) 
are applicable to the facts of the case at hand.9 On November 20, 2001, the Plaintiff delivered a 
5Id 
6IcL at (e). 
nSee, Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc. 761 P.2d 42 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 
8
 See, Id (quoting Frisbee v. K&K Const. Co. 676 P 2d. 387, 389 (Utah.1984)) .. '", ; 
9Utah Code Annotated 57-1-38(4) "A secured lender or servicer is not liable under 
Subsection (3) if the secured lender or servicer: (a) has established a reasonable procedure to 
release the security interest on a secured loan in a timely manner after the final payment on the 
loan; (b) has complied with this procedure in good faith; and (c) is unable to release the security 
interest within 90 days after receipt of the final payment because of the action or inaction of an 
cashiers check to Defendant's attorney as payment in full on certain property. This payment was 
made pursuant to a stipulated settlement of case number 990100647. On November 21, 2001, 
Plaintiff sent written demand for reconveyance. Rather than reconvey the property to Plaintiff 
directly, Defendant gathered paperwork necessary to have the deed reconveyed to Plaintiff, and 
sent these documents to Defendant's attorney handling the matter (Lundberg & Associates).10 
Lundberg sent these documents to Plaintiff via UPS on January 8, 2002. The documents were 
delivered to Plaintiffs porch on January 9, 2002. These documents were sent to Plaintiff 50 days 
after receiving payment in full. A document titled "Full Reconveyance" was recorded in Box 
Elder County, Utah on August 19,2002.n 
Plaintiff asserts that sending "do-it-yourself-forms" to ask the trustee for reconveyance is 
not sufficient to fit the statutory defenses.12 On the other hand, Defendant argues that its 
reasonable procedures, and good faith efforts to ensure reconveyance of title to Plaintiff takes 
them out of liability under the statute. Because there are material facts in dispute, and Plaintiff is 
not entitled to judgment as a matter of law, Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is hereby 
denied. 
agency or other person beyond its direct control." 
10These documents included "a cover letter with instructions on substituting a trustee and 
recording the reconveyance... [a] document titled 'Substitution of Trustee' executed by Dan 
Gitzlaff, Assistant Vice President of WMB (Washington Mutual Bank).. . [a] document titled 
'Certification of Lost Note or Lost Deed of Trust, Request for Full Reconveyance and 
Indemnification Agreement' " See Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Dismiss. 
uSee, Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss. 
12See, Plaintiffs memorandum in support of motion for summary judgment. 
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On to Defendant's Motion to Disqualify Plaintiffs Counsel. In light of Utah Rules of 
Professional Conduct 3.7 (Lawyer as Witness),13 Deferu : .* '• ^ e :!-'<fVir . J-si]',. ".!\ 
Plaintiffs Counsel. Defendant correctly points out that a lawyer may not be an advocate in an 
action when he/she will be a material witness in the same action. 
As applied to the facts of this case, it can be seen that Mr. Schultz is an essential witness 
in this proceeding. Defendant alleges certain agreements between Mr. Schultz and Attorney 
Jorgensen that, if made, establish a defense under the statue, and may require granting a motion 
to dismiss Mr. Schultz attached an affidavit to his memorandum in opposition to Defendant's •, 
motion to disqualify him. He recites various allegations of dishonesty on the part of Jorgensen to 
essentially dispute the arrangement Jorgensen alleges was made between them This goes to 
prove Defendant's point that he is a material witness in this case, in fact, only one of two first 
hand witness to central issues in that part of this case. 
I his case Joes not involve fets, the issue is contested, and there is no evidence that ;. 
disqualification would work a substantial hardship on Plaintiff.14 Therefore, Defendant's motion 
is granted. Plaintiff is hereby ordered to obtain new counsel, should it become necessary, in the 
further litigation of this matter.15 '•-• " - -'• 
]3See, Rule 3.7. "(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is 
likely to be a necessary witness except where: (1) The testimony relates to an uncontested issue; 
(2) The testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case; or (3) 
disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the client...." 
14i.e. the issues are not particularly complex, the case is still at an early phase of litigation. 
]5See, Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991 - ! — * •' 
similar to the case at hand, an attorney should have been disqualified. 
5 
Now, on to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. But first, as with 
the Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs Motion to Strike (Defendant's Reply to 
Plaintiffs response memorandum to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss) must be disposed of. 
There is no question that Defendant's reply memorandum was not timely filed pursuant to Rule 
4-501, Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, or Rule 6, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. On a 
strict time line, Defendant's reply is a month late. 
Defendant raises two issues for the consideration of this Court. The first issue is whether 
Plaintiff had to serve its response memorandum on all Defendant's attorneys, or just one. The 
second issue is whether the time line in Rule 4-501 is tolled until a notice to submit for decision 
is filed. Concerning the second issue, the five-day time to serve and file a reply does not run 
after a notice to submit, but before.16 
Concerning the issue of who must be served, the rule states that f,[t]he responding party 
shall file and serve upon all parties... ."n The issue is whether service on an attorney involved 
with the case, who subsequently withdrew, is sufficient to meet the requirements of the rule. 
Because the Plaintiff served a copy of her response memorandum on Defendant's attorney, who 
later did forward a copy of Plaintiff s Response to Defendant's other attorney, the five-day time 
line started to run after service on Janell Young, of Shapiro & Meinhold, L.L.P.. Therefore, 
Defendant's Reply memorandum to Defendant's response memorandum to motion to dismiss is 
]6See, Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. Rule 4-501(l)(D), "Upon the expiration of 
the five-day period to file a reply memorandum, either party may notify the clerk to submit the 
matter to the court for decision." 
l7See, id.at(l)(B). 
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struck. 
Finally, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss will be dealt with. Defendant filed its motion to 
dismiss on November 12,2002. A notice to submit for decision was filed on January 7, 2003 by 
the Defendant. Because Defendant's reply memorandum ua. ^eei; v r ; ^ *hL , oar: * .'.not 
examine it in order to dispose of this motion. It should be noted that the Court's decision would 
not be affected by receiving this memorandum. 
i.i.nufl i: LX' M ' >( t . -naan! .<• i - i . . u a ; M »»* • i-o - .*-.- t> <j *• -' \ - " k h i s • 
Defendant failed to have Plaintiffs deed "reconvey ed" to her within 90 days.18 After a diligent 
search, the Court is unable to find the word "reconvey" in that section of the Code.19 The Code 
says onl\ that tin holder of a security interest must "release the security interest on a secured 
loan within 90 days after receipt of the final payment of the loan. " (Emphasis added)20 
"Release", as defined in Blacks Law Dictionary, is "... a writing or an oral statement 
manifesting an intention to discharge another from an existing or asserted duty. The 
relinquishment, concession, or giving up of a right, claim, or privilege, by the person in whom it 
exists or to whom it accrues, to the person against whom, it might have been demanded oi 
enforced...." 
Plaintiff claims that she is entitled to recover statutory damages because Defendant failed 
to reconvey the ti ust deed it was holding within the 90 day ti me-line of I Jtah Code Annotated 57-
•
 nSee, Complaint, Para. 17, 19, 20, 23. . 
,9The Court is aware of Utah Code Annotated 57-1-33.1 and its requirement that" the 
trustee shall, upon written request by the beneficiary, reconvey the trust property." 
20See, Utah Code Annotated 57-1-38(3) 
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 ? 
1-38(3). Defendant answers that it is protected under Utah Code Annotated 57-1-38(4).21 
The facts of this case, as stated above are as follows, on November 20, 2001, the Plaintiff 
delivered a cashiers check to Defendant's attorney as payment in full on certain property. This 
payment was made as part of a stipulated settlement of case number 990100647. On November 
21, 2001, Plaintiff sent written demand for reconveyance. Rather than reconvey the property to 
Plaintiff directly, Defendant gathered paperwork necessary to have the deed reconveyed to 
Plaintiff, and sent these documents to Defendant's attorney handling the matter (Lundberg & 
Associates).22 Lundberg sent these documents to Plaintiff via UPS on January 8, 2002. The 
documents were delivered to Plaintiffs porch on January 9, 2002. These documents were sent to 
Plaintiff 50 days after receiving payment in full. A document titled "Full Reconveyance" was 
recorded in Box Elder County, Utah on August 19,2002.23 
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss "admits the facts alleged in the complaint but 
21
 Utah Code Annotated 57-1-38(4) "A secured lender or servicer is not liable under 
Subsection (3) if the secured lender or servicer: (a) has established a reasonable procedure to 
release the security interest on a secured loan in a timely manner after the final payment on the 
loan; (b) has complied with this procedure in good faith; and (c) is unable to release the security 
interest within 90 days after receipt of the final payment because of the action or inaction of an 
agency or other person beyond its direct control." 
22These documents included "a cover letter with instructions on substituting a trustee and 
recording the reconveyance... [a] document titled 'Substitution of Trustee' executed by Dan 
Gitzlaff, Assistant Vice President of WMB (Washington Mutual Bank)... [a] document titled 
'Certification of Lost Note or Lost Deed of Trust, Request for Full Reconveyance and 
Indemnification Agreement"...." See Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Dismiss. 
23See, Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss. 
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challenges the Plaintiffs right to relief based on those facts."24 When the facts of this case are 
applied to Utah Code Annotated 57-1-38(4) it is seen that a reasonable procedure was established 
to release the security interest in a timely manner,25 the procedure was followed in good faith,26 
and the reconveyance of the subject deed beyond 90 days was not the fault of the Defendant, the 
documents were sent and after that were in the control of the Plaintiff. 
For the reasons stated, the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is hereby granted. 
Dated this > day of February, 2003. 
24See, St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp. ^ J :'._d 194 (paraphrasing « . \ 
Am. Jur. 2d Pleadings 227 (1981). 
25
 Collecting, executing and delivering in a timely manner, documents to accomplish the 
full reconveyance of the property. 
26The timely manner in which the documents were compiled and sent out are evidence of 
good faith. 
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